Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 21

Issue 1

Article 2

5-1-2001

Frozen Embryos and Divorce: Technological Marvel Meets the
Human Condition
Thomas D. Arado

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Thomas D. Arado, Comment, Frozen Embryos and Divorce: Technological Marvel Meets the Human
Condition, 21 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 241 (2001).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Frozen Embryos and Divorce: Technological
Marvel Meets the Human Condition1
So God created man in his own image, in the image of God
created he him; male and female created he them. And God
blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and
2
multiply ....
Through the ingenuity of humankind, life can now be created in a petri
dish and with it comes a genesis of the legal rights to that life. The 1978 birth
of Louise Brown, the first child born using in vitro fertilization (IVF),3 opened
up a new world of legal wrangling which culminated in the Tennessee
Supreme Court decision of Davis v. Davis in 1992.' The issue of frozen
preembryos in divorce cases raises constitutional, property and contract issues
which courts will increasingly have to address. The constitutional issue pits
the one party's right to procreate against the other party's right to not
procreate.5 The property issue concerns "ownership" of the frozen preembryos
between the parties.' The contract issue involves agreements sometimes made
upon entry into the in vitro fertilization program, which can determine the
disposition of the preembryos upon termination of the IVF program.7 Part I
of this article will introduce the reader to the process of in vitro fertilization.
Part II will discuss relevant case law to date involving the disposition of frozen
preembryos, including Davis. Part 1H1 will discuss the three prevalent views
concerning the status of preembryos. Part IV of this article will analyze these
1. The term "embryo" means "the product of conception during the stage from
implantation in the uterine cavity up to six weeks after fertilization." JONATHAN GLOVER ET
AL, ETHICS OF NEW REPRODUCrIVE TECHNOLOGIES: THE GLOVER REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION 94 (1989). "Preembryo" refers to "the product of conception, from fertilization
up to implantation in the uterine cavity." Id. "Fetus" means "the product of conception from
the end of the embryonic stage to birth." Id. Though often referred to as "embryos" by courts
and commentators, the more proper term that will be used throughout this article is
"preembryo."
2. Genesis 1:27-28.
3. Samuel A. Gunsburg, FrozenLife's Dominion:Extending ReproductiveAutonomy
Rights to In Vitro Fertilization,65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2205, 2205 (1997).

4. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).

5. See generally Jennifer L. Carow, Note, Davis v. Davis:An InconsistentException
to an OtherwiseSound Rule Advancing ProcreationalFreedomandReproductive Technology,

43 DEPAuL L. REV. 523, 526 (1994) (discussing how the right of privacy can "encompass the
two coexisting rights of procreation and nonprocreation").
6. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
7. See generally Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (finding an agreement
between the husband and wife controlling because it was clear and unambiguous and manifested
their intentions).
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views, how they may be adopted by courts in the future and how they may be
applied to new cases, such as one recent case in Illinois. Finally, Part V will
review the relevant parts of the Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies
Act as proposed by the Committee on the Laws of Assisted Reproductive
Technologies and Genetics of the American Bar Association and advocate its
adoption.' The question of who may obtain frozen preembryos in divorce
situations is not a pleasant one, but using the principles outlined in this article,
equitable solutions may be found.
I. INVITRO FERTILIZATION
Infertility' affects approximately 6.1 million people in the United States.'°
Some form of infertility services are used by an estimated one million couples
annually, with approximately 110,000 to 160,000 new cases arising every
year." In vitro fertilization represents less than five percent of infertility
services nationally and impacts United States health care costs by three
hundredths of one percent.' It costs approximately $7,800 for a single IVF
cycle in the United States. 3 The IVF procedure is primarily used for women
8. The Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act "has not yet been approved
by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association and,
accordingly, should not be construed as representing the policy of the American Bar
Association." MODEL ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS. Acr preface (Discussion Draft 1999).
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) is "any treatment provided for the purpose of
achieving assisted conception." MODEL ASSiSTED REPROD. TEcHs. Acr § 1.01(3).
9. Infertility is "defined as the inability to reproduce after a year ofregular intercourse
without contraceptives." JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHLDREN OFCHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCrIVE TECHNOLOGIES 97 (1994).
10. This equals about ten percent of the reproductive age population in the United
States, affecting men and women equally. Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., ASRM: Frequently
Asked QuestionsAbout Infertility,at http://www.asrm.org/patient/faqs.html (last visited Jan. 3.
2000) [hereinafter ASRM: FrequentlyAsked Questions].
11. Infertility treatment has grown into abillion-dollar industry. The number ofdoctors
specializing in infertility also continues to increase, allowing fertility services to become more
widely available to the public. Couples who find themselves infertile "often experience guilt,
low self-esteem, disappointment or depression, and have higher rates of marital conflict and
sexual dysfunction. Couples who seek treatment often find it difficult to stop until they have
tried every alternative available." Due to medical insurance now covering many infertility
services, couples are more willing to seek medical help to deal with their infertility.
ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 98. The Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act would
require health insurance coverage for the treatment of infertility. See MODEL ASSISTED
REPROD. TEa-S. AcT § 1.08(4).
12. Eighty-five to ninety percent of infertility cases are treated with conventional
therapies, including drug treatment or surgery. ASRM: FrequentlyAsked Questions, supranote
10.
13. Id. A cycle is defined as "the period including stimulation of the ovaries to produce
eggs and the aspiration, or removal, of the eggs." Advanced Fertility Ctr. of Chicago, Standard
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whose fallopian tubes are damaged or diseased, but can still produce healthy

eggs.' 4 The damaged fallopian tubes block the eggs from travelling from the
ovaries to the uterus.' 5 IVF can also help men who have a low sperm count or
low sperm motility, which will prevent the sperm from reaching the eggs
naturally.' 6 The national average for delivery rates for IVF in women under
age thirty-five is 33.6% per transfer procedure with an average of 3.9
preembryos transferred to the uterus per procedure. 7 Since IVF was
introduced in the United States in 1981, more than 45,000 American babies
have been born from IVF.1s
IVF begins with the removal of eggs from the follicles of a woman's
ovaries.' 9 Subcutaneous injections are required to shut down the woman's
pituitary gland)' Her ovaries are then stimulated to produce eggs with eight
days of intermuscular injections. 2 ' Laparoscopy 22 or ultrasound-directed
needle aspiration are used to remove the eggs.' The eggs are then placed in
a glass dish where they are mixed with sperm.' Once fertilized, the preIVF Package Pricing, at http://www.advancedfertility.com/ivfprice.htm (last visited Jan. 5,

2000) [hereinafter Standard IVF].

14. BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF
EMBRYOS AND FETUSES 195 (1992).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 1996 was the last year for which data is available from the Center for Disease
Control. "A multiple birth is counted as one five birth." Ctr. for Disease Control, 1996
National Summary, at http://www2.cdc.govlnccdphp/drh/art96/nation96.asp (last visited Jan.

6, 2000) [hereinafter 1996 NationalSummary]. The greater the age of the woman, the lower

the rates of success. The national average for women between thirty-five and thirty-nine was
26.8% per transfer procedure; an average of four preembryos transferred per procedure. For
women over thirty-nine, the national average per cycle was 12.4%; an average of 4.1
preembryos transferred per procedure. Id.
18. Over 70,000 American babies have been born from all assisted reproductive
technologies. ASRM: FrequentlyAsked Questions, supranote 10.
19. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992).

20.

Id. Subcutaneous injections are given with avery small needle, just under the skin,

usually in the abdomen, thigh or back of the upper arm. Advanced Fertility Ctr. of Chicago,
Details About the Subcutaneous Injections for Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization, at
http://www.advancedfertility.coml subqinj.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2000).
21. Id.
22. Laparoscopy is a surgical procedure that allows the doctor to directly view the
organs in the abdominal and pelvic area. It is performed in a hospital under general anesthesia.
A one-half inch incision in or just below the woman's navel is made and a laparoscope, a
telescope-like instrument, is inserted. LoI B. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S
GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS, INCLUDING IN VITRO FERTILIZATION,
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, AND SURROGATE MoTHERHOOD 42 (1984).
23. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998).
24. The glass dish is where the procedure gets its name. In vitro means "in glass."
STEINBOCK, supra note 14, at 195.
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zygote begins to divide.' Once the pre-zygote reaches the four-to-eight cell
26
stage, they are delivered to a woman's uterus using a cervical catheter. If
more preembryos are created than are initially needed, the remaining
preembryos can undergo cryopreservation.2 7
The process of cryopreservation' requires freezing the preembryos in
29
liquid nitrogen either at the two-, four- or eight-cell stage of development
Only preembryos in these stages of development are used, as preembryos in
single-cell stages are difficult to freeze and preembryos in later stages may not
develop after thawing. ° Without cryopreservation, a woman would have to
undergo the painful and expensive procedure of harvesting eggs each time an
attempt at fertilization was made.3" It is also useful where a woman may want
to have additional children in the future or may have some health problem,
32
procedure again.
such as damaged ovaries, that prevents undergoing the
Cryopreservation may increase the chances of pregnancy because the
preembryos can later be placed in her body during a normal menstrual cycle,
free from the stimulating drugs 3 3 However, the rate for live births from frozen
preembryos is only 18.2% for women under thirty-five with the average
34
number of preembryos transferred to the uterus at 3.5 per procedure. Using
cryogenically preserved preembryos may reduce costs compared with multiple
standard IVF procedures. At the Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago, the
standard IVF package price is $6,000, while the cost of freezing the
preembryos is $400 and the cost of subsequent thawing of the preembryos and
one "frozen transfer" procedure is $3,000.

25.
26.
27.

5

There appears to be no additional

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175.
Id.

Andrea Michelle Siegel, Legal Resolution to the Frozen Embryo Dilemma, 4 J.

PHARMACY & L. 43, 46 (1995).

28. Cryopreservation was developed in 1981. Id.
29. Marcia Joy Wurmbrand, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implications,
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1986).
30. Id.
31. Siegel, supra note 27, at 47.
32. Wurmbrand, supra note 29, at 1084.
33. Gunsburg, supra note 3, at 2211.
34. For women thirty-five to thirty-nine, the rate of live births from frozen preembryos
is 16.5% per transfer procedure (3.5 preembryos transferred per procedure) and for women over
thirty-nine, the rate is 10.5% per transfer procedure (3.4 preembryos transferred per procedure).
1996 NationalSummary, supranote 17.
35. The $400 preembryo freezing includes one year of storage and each year after that
costs $360. StandardJVF,supranote 13. The prices are based on the "cash discounted price."
"Cash discounted" refers to prices given to couples lacking insurance coverage or those that
submit the billing to their own insurance company after paying in advance. "Package prices"
are not accepted by insurance companies, so insurance is billed by individual procedure. The
final amount billed depends on which procedures are actually used during treatment. Id.
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risk of birth defects or other health problems in children conceived from frozen
preembryos as compared to children born "naturally."'
Though cryopreservation is an economically effective procedure for the
couple, problems arise when, between fertilization and implantation of the
frozen preembryo, the couple decides to divorce." This is exactly what
occurred in the cases of Davis v. Davis," Kass v. Kass,39 and an increasing

number of cases around the world in which the parties divorced and one of the
parties changed their mind regarding the in vitro fertilization process. 40 These
changes have forced courts to consider the status of frozen preembryos and the
parties' rights to reproductive autonomy."'
H. CASES
The first occasion in which the fate of frozen preembryos had to be
determined occurred in Australia in 1983.42 Mario and Elsa Rios were a
millionaire South American couple living in Los Angeles who were unable to
conceive.43 In 1981, the couple turned to the Queen Victoria Medical Center
in Melbourne, Australia, to solve their infertility problem." With the clinic's
help, Elsa did become pregnant through the IVF process; however, she later
miscarried.4' The two remaining preembryos were frozen for use in future
procedures.' In 1983, Mr. and Mrs. Rios died when their plane crashed in
Chile. 7 The Waller Committee convened in Australia to review the legal and
ethical questions the frozen preembryos presented." In 1984, the committee
determined that the two cryopreserved preembryos had no independent legal
36. Wurmbrand, supra note 29, at 1086-87.
37. Gunsburg, supra note 3, at 2211.
38. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
39. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
40. Compare Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589, with Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175.
41. Gunsburg, supra note 3, at 2210.
42. Siegel, supra note 27, at 48.
43. Id.; David T. Ozar, The CaseAgainst Thawing UnusedFrozen Embryos, HASTING
CTR. REP., Aug. 1985, at 7.
44. Ozar, supra note 43, at 7.
45. Siegel, supra note 27, at 48.
46. Id.; Ozar, supra note 43, at 7.
47. Ozar, supra note 43, at 7.
48.

Siegel, supra note 27, at 49. The Waller Committee was a multi-disciplinary

committee formed in May 1982, by the government of the State of Victoria, Australia. The
committee was created for the purpose of considering the legal, social and ethical issues
associated with in vitro fertilization. The committee was named after the chair, Professor Louis
Waller, the Law Reform Commissioner at the time Standing Review & Advisory Comm. on
Infertility, SRA ClAnnual Report 1996, athttp:/hna.flh.vic.gov.au/phb/hce/ infert/lookback.htm
(last visited Jan. 21, 2001).
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rights and recommended that they be destroyed.49 The legislators of the State
of Victoria rejected the committee's recommendation, deciding instead for
However, as of the last known report, the Rios
embryonic adoption.'
preembryos were still frozen. 5
The first case to consider the fate of frozen preembryos in a divorce
situation was Davis v. Davis, decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
1992.52 Mary Sue Davis and Junior Lewis Davis were married on April 26,
1980. 53 Mary Sue could conceive, but unfortunately suffered from tubal
pregnancies which led to the removal of her right fallopian tube and ligation
of her left fallopian tube.' As a result of these procedures, she was no longer
able to conceive naturally.55 After unsuccessful attempts to adopt, the Davises
56
determined that in vitro fertilization was their best hope to become parents.
The Davises began in 1985 to undergo IVF procedures and suffered through
six unsuccessful attempts to conceive at a cost of $35,000.' In 1988, the
clinic the Davises were using began a cryogenic preservation program in
which the Davises agreed to participate.58 At that time, the Davises had no
thoughts of divorce. 5 On December 8, 1988, nine eggs were retrieved from
On December 10, 1988, a transfer of two
Mary Sue and fertilized.'
preembryos was performed and the remaining seven preembryos were
frozen." Neither of the transferred preembryos resulted in pregnancy and
before another transfer could be attempted, in February 1989, Junior Davis
filed for divorce. 62 The Tennessee circuit court held that "custody" of the
preembryos should be vested in Mrs. Davis for the purpose of implantation.63
The court determined that: 1) "human life begins at conception";6 2) the
49. Siegel, supra note 27, at 49; Ozar, supra note 43, at 7.
50. Wurmbrand, supra note 29, at 1080. Embryonic adoption called for surrogate
mothers to receive the preembryos, and if any pregnancies came to term, the children would be
placed for adoption. Ozar, supranote 43, at 7.
51. See James Lieber, The Case of the Frozen Embryos, SATURDAY EVENING POST,

Oct. 1989, at 50.
52. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

61.
1989).
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 591.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id.

Id.; Davis v. Davis, No. E-1,496, 1989 WL 140495, at *3(Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592.
Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *11.
at *1.
Id.
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Davises "produced human beings, in vitro, to be known as their child or
children";6 5 3) the doctrine of parens patriae applies to in vitro preembryos;"
and 4) it served the best interest of the child or children, in vitro, to be brought
to term through implantation with their mother, Mary Sue.67 Junior Davis then
appealed the trial court's decision."
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed, finding that the trial court's
award of the frozen preembryos to Mary Sue for implantation against Junior's
will constituted "impermissible state action in violation of Junior's
constitutionally protected right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has
taken place.', 9 The court of appeals noted that the United States Supreme
Court had recognized the right to procreate as a basic civil right." The
Supreme Court had subsequently held that an individual also has a right to
prevent procreation.
The court of appeals found that there was "no
compelling state interest to justify the ordering of implantation against the will
of either party."'72 The court awarded Mary Sue and Junior joint control of the
frozen preembryos and "equal voice over their disposition."3 At the time of
the appeal, Mary Sue had moved from Tennessee, had remarried and wished
to donate the frozen preembryos to a childless couple rather than implant them
in herself.74 Mary Sue appealed the court of appeals' decision to the Supreme
Court of Tennessee.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee granted review of the court of appeals'
decision because of the importance of the case in the development of law
regarding reproductive technologies and due to inadequate guidance to the trial
court by the court of appeals. 7' In affirming the court of appeals' decision, the
Tennessee Supreme Court inspected the scientific evidence," examined the
legal and ethical debate of whether a preembryo should be considered
65. Id.
66.

Id. "The doctrine of parens patriae is most commonly expressed as the 'best

interests of the child doctrine' and its sole objective is to achieve justice for the child." Id. at
*11.

67. Id. at*1.
68.

Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990WL 130807, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990).

69. Id.

70. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), where the right to procreate
was recognized as a "basic civil right").
71. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the right not to
procreate or to prevent procreation was initially recognized).
72. Id.
73. Id. at *3.
74. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 592-94.
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79
"persons" or "property, ' 78 considered the role of contractual agreements, and

80
examined the right of procreational autonomy. The court rejected the trial
8
court's finding that human life began at the moment of conception. ' The
Tennessee Supreme Court found that preembryos could not be considered
"persons" under Tennessee law or federal law. 2 However, the court
concluded that the preembryos were also not "property," but because of their
potential for human life, occupied an interim category that entitled them to
"special respect."" Thus, the court concluded, the Davises did not have a true
property interest, but an interest in the "nature of ownership" to the extent that
they had "decision-making authority concerning the disposition of the

78.
79.

See id. at 594-97.
See id. at 597-98.

80. See id. at 598-603.
81. The court rejected the trial court's finding that there was no distinction between
embryos and preembryos which had led the trial court to conclude that human life begins at
conception and that the preembryos were, in fact, "children in vitro." Id. at 594.
82. The court examined how the state treated fetuses in the womb. Tennessee's
wrongful death statute, section 20-5-106 of the Tennessee Code, "does not allow a wrongful
death for a viable fetus that is not first born alive," and the state supreme court had previously
determined that "without live birth ... a fetus is not a 'person' within the meaning of the
statute." Id. Additional statutes and court determinations have led to similar conclusions. Id.
at 594, 595. The court cited Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in which the United States
Supreme Court "explicitly refused to hold that the fetus possesses independent rights under law"
and that "the unborn have never been recognized as persons in the whole sense." Id. at 595.
83. The court based its finding of "special respect" within the ethical standards
provided by the American Fertility Society. These standards state:
Three major ethical positions have been articulated in the debate over
preembryo status. At one extreme is the view of the preembryo as a
human subject after fertilization, which requires that it be accorded the
rights of a person. This position entails an obligation to provide an
opportunity for implantation to occur and tends to ban any action before
transfer that might harm the preembryo or that is not immediately
therapeutic, such as freezing and some preembryo research.
At the opposite extreme is the view that the preembryo has a status no
different from any other human tissue. With the consent of those who
have decision-making authority over the preembryo, no limits should be
imposed on actions taken with preembryos.
A third view - one that is most widely held - takes an intermediate
position between the other two. It holds that the preembryo deserves
respect greater than that accorded to human tissue but not the respect
accorded to actual persons. The preembryo is due greater respect than
other human tissue because of its potential to become a person and
because of its symbolic meaning for many people. Yet it should not be
treated as a person, because it has not yet developed the features of
personhood, it is not yet established as developmentally individual, and
may never realize its biologic potential.
Id. at 596-97 (quoting Report of the Ethics Committee oftheAmerican FertilitySociety, 53 AM.
FERTILITY SOC'Y

6, 345-55 (1990)).

20011
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preembryos."
With regard to contractual agreements, though in this case
there was no agreement between the parties concerning the disposition of the
preembryos, the court found that if such an agreement had existed it would be
presumed valid and enforceable.8 5 The right to procreational autonomy is
based on the right to privacy that was implicitly found within the Constitution
of the United States as well as the Tennessee Constitution. 6 The right to
procreate was found to be "a vital part of an individual's right to privacy"
under the Tennessee state constitution and federal law," and is composed of
the "right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation," both "subject to
protections and limitations."88 The decisional authority over the preembryos
was found to rest in the genetic providers alone, "at least to the extent that their
decisions have an impact upon their individual reproductive status."8 9 The
state's interest in potential human life was "insufficient to justify an
infringement on the gamete-provider's procreational autonomy."
The Tennessee Supreme Court resolved the case by developing a
balancing test which weighed the interests of the parties involved. 9 First, a
court must look at the preferences of the genetic providers:92
If their wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is a dispute,
then their prior agreement concerning disposition should be
carried out. If no prior agreement exists, then the relative
interests of the parties in using or not using the preembryos
must be weighed. Ordinarily the party wishing to avoid
84. Id. at 597.
85. Parties would be allowed to mutually modify the agreement to deal with all the
turns that events may take as the IVF process unfolds. Id. at 597. The argument that an implied
contract to reproduce existed was rejected on the basis that there was "no indication... that
disposition in the event of contingencies other than Mary Sue Davis's pregnancy was ever
considered by the parties, or that Junior Davis intended to pursue reproduction outside the
confines of a continuing marital relationship with Mary Sue." Id. at 598.
86. "The right to privacy is not specifically mentioned in either the federal or the
Tennessee state constitution, and yet there can be little doubt about its grounding in the concept
of liberty reflected in those two documents." Id. at 598.
87. Id. at600.
88. Id. at 601; see also supra note 5.
89. ld. at 602.
90. "The United States Supreme Court has indicated ...that the state's interest in
potential human life may justify statutes or regulations that have an impact upon a person's
exercise of procreational autonomy.... Tennessee's statutes contain no statement of public
policy which reveals an interest that could justify infringing on [genetic] providers' decisional
authority over the preembryos to which they have contributed," but rather the statutes reveal "a
policy decision to recognize that persons born alive or capable of sustaining life [outside the
womb] have a higher status than do fetuses [within the womb]." Id.
91. See id. at 604.
92. Id. at 604.
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procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has
a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means
other than use of the preembryos in question. If no other
reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of
using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be
considered. However, if the party seeking control of the
preembryos intends merely to donate them to another
couple, the objecting party has the greater interest and
should prevail."w
The court balanced Junior Davis's interest in avoiding parenthood with
Mary Sue Davis's interest in donating the preembryos to another couple for
implantation and determined that Junior's interest outweighed Mary Sue's.
The facts of Kass v. Kass are initially very similar to Davis. Maureen and
Steven Kass were married in July of 1988.' s They entered into an in vitro
fertilization program and by 1993 had six failed attempts through the
program." They then entered a new program wherein eggs were taken from
Maureen, fertilized with Steven's sperm and an attempt was made to implant
some of the preembryos into Maureen's sister.' This attempt failed as well
and the remaining five preembryos were frozen." Unlike Davis, the Kasses
had executed informed consent forms which provided that, in the case of
divorce, the preembryos would be released as directed by an order of a court,
or, upon their "death or any other unforeseen circumstances," the frozen
preembryos would be "disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research
investigation as determined by the IVF Program."" In July of 1993, Maureen
began divorce proceedings and sought to recover the preembryos for the
purpose of implanting them in herself"'° The trial court determined that
Steven did not have a constitutional right to avoid procreation because there
was no distinction between preembryos created through in vitro fertilization
and preembryos created through natural conception.'. Based on these
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
where the

Id.
Id.
Kass v. Kass, No. 19658-93, 1995 WL 110368, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
The court based its view on Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976),
United States Supreme Court determined that a father did not have a right to

determine the outcome of a pregnancy. Because the trial court found preembryos outside the
womb to be the same as preembryos within the womb, it felt that the principles of Danforth
applied. Id. at *3.
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determinations, the court found that Maureen had the exclusive right to
determine the fate of the preembryos and that the consent forms she had signed
did not waive this right."° The plurality decision of the appellate division
reversed the trial court and found
the decision to attempt to have children through IVF procedures and the determination of the fate of cryopreserved
pre-zygotes resulting therefrom are intensely personal and
essentially private matters which are appropriately resolved
by the prospective parents rather than the courts. Accordingly, where the parties have indicated their mutual intent
regarding the disposition of the pre-zygotes in the event of
the occurrence of a contingency, that decision must be
scrupulously honored, and the courts must refrain from any
interference with the parties' expressed wishes. The documentary evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the
parties in this case made such a clear and unequivocal
choice, and the plaintiff' s subsequent change of heart cannot
be permitted to unilaterally alter their mutual decision.'03
The Court of Appeals of New York unanimously affirmed the plurality
decision of the appellate division and concluded the parties clearly expressed
their intent that in the instance of divorce, the preembryos would be donated
to the IVF program for research purposes." 4
Cases are beginning to appear outside the United States as well. In 1996,
the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that a woman's right to motherhood superseded a man's right not to be a father. 05 In Scotland, a divorced man sued a
fertility clinic for impregnating his former wife by using frozen preembryos
fertilized with his sperm without his permission."° '

102. Id. at *4-5.
103. Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581,590 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
104. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998).
105. A five-judge panel of the Israeli Supreme Court had heard the case a year before,
ruling in favor of the father that the state could not impose parenthood on men or women. The
Israeli Supreme Court then reconvened the entire court to reconsider the decision. Israeli Court
Asked to Stop Woman from Surrogacy Effort, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY, Oct. 3, 1996,
available at 1996 WL 15745806.
106. Father Caught Out by Frozen Sperm Birth, SCOTLANDONSUNDAY, Aug. 30,1998,
available at 1998 WL 13914551.'
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III. LEGAL STATUS OF THE PREEMBRYO

There are three basic views that courts have adopted in determining the
rights of genetic providers and frozen genetic material.' 7 The preembryo has
been viewed as life or "persons," "property," and finally as occupying an
interim category between life and property, thus demanding a "special
respect."' 10 8

A. PREEMBRYOS AS PERSONS

The trial court in Davis found that the frozen preembryos were human
beings and, therefore, vested with rights which the court then sought to
protect.' 09 This decision created a legitimate state interest in protection of the
preembryos and allowed the court to invoke the "best interests of the child"
doctrine."0 One problem with this view is that a fetus is not a "person" within
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment nor by precedent under Roe v.
Wade."' The Roe court found that while there has always been strong support
for the view that life begins upon live birth,' 2 there was greater significance
in the common law in "quickening. 13 or the first recognizable movement of
the fetus within the womb."1 4 However, physicians have tended to focus upon
one of three events in determining when life begins: conception, live birth, or
the interim point at which the fetus becomes "viable.""' The court decided
that the point at which the state's legitimate interest in potential life becomes
compelling is at viability."' As the Tennessee Supreme Court pointed out in
Davis, the point of viability is "far removed, both qualitatively and quantitatively," from that of four- to eight-cell preembryos."17 Further, the term
"person" includes "the capacity to be consentient, to think, to feel and to
become aware of other people," a stage reached only after months of newborn

107. Siegel, supra note 27, at 49. "Gamete" means male or female reproductive cells,
including sperm or oocytes (i.e. eggs). See MODELASSISTED REPROD. TECHS. AcT § 1.01(10).
108. Siegel, supra note 27, at 49; Carow, supra note 5, at 538.
109. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *1 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989).
110. Siegel, supra note 27, at 49.

111. Fritz K. Belier & Gail P. Zlatnik, Medical Aspects of the Beginning of Individual
Lives, in THE BEGINNING oFHuMAN LIFE 5 (Fritz K. Beller & Robert F. Weir eds., 1994).
112. 410 U.S. 113, 160(1973).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 132.
115. Viability is the point at which the fetus can "live outside the mother's womb." Id.
at 160.

116.
117.

Id. at 163.
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992).
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life.' 8 Scientific data supports the theory that the beginning of pregnancy is
not fertilization, but the point when the preembryo implants in the uterus." 9
Therefore, the term "person" is not accurate in discussing the beginning of
human life.'" Fertilization itself is a gradual process lasting several hours
The fertilized egg develops the
after the sperm has penetrated the egg.'
ability to implant in the wall of the uterus and form the placenta six to nine
days later." Implantation then marks the beginning of the maternal state of
Approximately fifty to seventy percent of naturally fertilized
pregnancy.'
eggs fail to implant within the uterus." If pregnancy marks the beginning of
human life and pregnancy does not begin with fertilization, but with implantation, and the odds of implantation for in vitro preembryos is relatively low,' 6
then the "potential" for human life of in vitro preembryos is equally low.'1
Therefore, finding that the preembryos enjoy the status of "persons" has little
basis constitutionally nor scientifically."
B. PREEMBRYOS AS PROPERTY

If preembryos are not persons, can they be considered personal property
of those who supplied the genetic material?" Determining the preembryo to
be personal property is to find they are the same as any human tissue with no
special consideration given to the fact that it may have "potential life."' 2 9 This
view gives the genetic providers the right to almost exclusive authority over
the tissue to the exclusion of medical personnel and the state. 3" If the

118. Beller & Zlatnick, supra note 11, at 5.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 101.
122. The undeveloped inner cell mass is the source of the embryo proper and thus, the
preimplantation stages are more correctly referred to as the "preembryo." Id.
123. Id.
124. Beller & Zlatnick, supranote Il l, at 4.
125. In women under thirty-five, the national average for live birth delivery rates using
IVF was 33.6% per transfer procedure with an average of 3.9 preembryos transferred per
procedure. A multiple birth is counted as one live birth. 1996 National Summary, supra note
17.
126. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992); Belier & Zlatnick, supra
note 111, at 4; RoBERTSON, supra note 9, at 102.
127. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
128. Kristine E. Luongo, The Big Chill: Davis v. Davis andthe Protectionof "Potential
Life" ?, 29 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1011, 1020 (1995).
129. Id.
130. Siegel, supra note 27, at 51.
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preembryo is determined to be personal property, it may be treated with the
same regard as any other personal property. 3 '
In the Virginia case of York v. Jones,'3 2 the court used the personal
property view to decide the case between the genetic providers and their clinic
which created and stored the preembryos in question."' Steven York and Risa
Adler-York were accepted into an IVF program in Norfolk, Virginia, in
1986. "' They signed a "Cryopreservation Agreement" which outlined the
procedure for cryopreservation of the preembryos and explained their rights
in the frozen preembryos 3 The Yorks ended up having six preembryos
created, five of which were transferred to Risa; the remaining one was
frozen. 36 In 1988, the Yorks sought to have the frozen preembryo transferred
from the Virginia clinic to one in Los Angeles, California, but the Virginia
clinic refused. 3 The court found that a bailor-bailee relationship was created
with the "Cryopreservation Agreement.', 39 In the agreement, the Virginia
clinic had defined the limits of their possessory interest by recognizing the
Yorks' proprietary rights in the preembryo' 39 The court found the clinic had
"fully recognized the Yorks' property rights" in the preembryo and had
"limited their rights as bailee to exercise dominion and control over" the
preembryo. 14 The result of the decision of the court was to remove the state
from any role in the controversy and give the genetic providers alone power
to decide the preembryo's fate. 4'

131. Luongo, supra note 128, at 1020.
132. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
133. Id. at 425; Carow, supra note 5, at 542.
134. York, 717 F. Supp. at 423.
135. The Cryopreservation Agreement explained that the cryopreservation procedure is
available in the event more than five [preembryos] are retrieved during the IVF treatment. The
Agreement further stated that the cryopreservation procedure is intended to reduce the risk of
multiple births, while simultaneously "creating additional opportunities for the initiation of
pregnancy with the transfer of concepti developed from frozen-thawed" preembryos.
Id. at 424.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 425.
139. The court noted that the agreement referred to "our pre-zygote" repeatedly. It also
clearly stated that should the Yorks divorce, ownership of the preembryo "must be determined

in a property settlement." In addition, the agreement provided that the Yorks had "the principle
responsibility to decide the disposition" of the preembryo and that the preembryo would not be
released by the clinic without the written consent of both of the Yorks. Id. at 426.
140. Id.
141.

Siegel, supra note 27, at 53.
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Rights in property are made up of a "bundle" of rights that particular
human beings have with respect to particular objects." Property is not a
"thing," but a "set of legal relations between persons governing the use of
things."'4 3 Property law examines the relationships between people and their
particular objects.'" A "bundle of rights" property theory in regards to a
preembryo examines the genetic providers' rights to prevent others from
asserting an interest limiting their rights to the preembryo. 145 Using terms such
as "ownership" or "property" in reference to the preembryos may be
distinguishable from their use regarding inanimate objects.'" The term
"ownership" in that case may merely signify the person making legal decisions
freezing, discard, donation, use in research, and
over such things as "creation,
47
uterus."'
a
in
placement
Viewing preembryos as property is useful when the dispute is between
the genetic providers and a third party, such as a clinic. However, when the
disputing parties are the genetic providers themselves, the usefulness of this
view becomes tenuous.' 48 In a community property state, for example, any
property the couple acquires during the marriage is equally divided between
them upon divorce.' 4 ' If Mary Sue and Junior Davis had lived in a community
property state, both parties could have conceivably ended up with three-and-ahalf preembryos, frustrating the desires of both parties. 5
C. INTERIM STATUS

5'
The third view finds that preembryos should receive "special respect."'
Under this position, the preembryo is given greater respect than other human
tissue because of its potential to become a human being.'52 However, "it
should not be treated as a person, because it has not yet developed the features

142. Robert J. Muller. Davis v. Davis: The Applicability of Privacy and Property Rights
to the Disposition of Frozen Preembryos in Intrafamilial Disputes, 24 U. TOL L. REv. 763, 795

(1993).

143.
144.

Id. at 796.
" 'More precisely, the law of property considers the way rights to use things may

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
See Carow, supra note 5, at 560.
d. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 540.

be parceled out amongst a host of competing resource users. Each resource user is conceived
as holding a bundle of rights vis-&-vis other potential users.' " Id. (quoting BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTrruFION 25-26 (1997)).
145. Muller, supra note 142, at 796.
146. ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 104.

152.

Luongo, supra note 128, at 1022.
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of personhood, is not yet established as developmentally individual, and may
never realize its biological potential."' This view has received widespread
support from numerous medical and legal commentators." 5 The American
Fertility Society adopted this view in its ethical standards.'
The Ethics
Advisory Board of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare stated
that "the human embryo is entitled to profound respect; but this respect does
not necessarily encompass the full legal and moral rights attributed to
persons."5 6 The Warnock Committee in Great Britain concluded that "the
embryo of the human species ought to have a special status" and "should be
afforded some protection in law."'5 7 This theory that preembryos deserve a
"special respect" was ultimately adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Davis.5
Similar to the "preembryos as property" view, the interim status view
gives the genetic providers the primary decision-making authority over the
preembryos.5 9 However, the decision-making authority is not absolute, but
could be superseded by the implementation of specific legislation to the
contrary."w Under the interim status view, each developmental stage of the
preembryo would bring it increased protection.' This view gives consideration to the interests of the genetic providers as well as the state.' 62 The
interim status view also allows for parties to make contractual arrangements
that would control the disposition of preembryos 63
IV. ANALYSIS

Much of the outcome of a case involving who gets preembryos in a
divorce situation depends on the characterization of the preembryo.' Take,
153. Id. This biological potential may not be realized because of the relatively low
percentage (33.6% for women under thirty-five) of successful pregnancies using IVF. 1996
NationalSummary, supra note 17.

154.
155.
156.

Siegel, supra note 27, at 53-54.

See supra note 83.
STEINBOCK, supra note 14, at 208.

157. Id. The Warnock Committee was set up in 1982 by the British government "to
consider the implications of surrogate motherhood, cloning, in vitro fertilization and other
methods of helping childless couples." It consisted of doctors, lawyers, theologians, social
scientists and ordinary citizens. MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK
REPORT ON HumANIFERTnISATION & EMBRYOLOGY cover (1985).

158. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596-97 (Tenn. 1992).
159. Luongo, supra note 128, at 1023.
160. Id.

161.

Id.

164.

See id. at 594.

162.
163.

Id.
See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
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for example, the recent case in Illinois involving Margaret Hale and Todd
Ginestra, who were married in 1993 and filed for divorce in July of 1999."65
Before entering into an IVF program, the couple signed a consent form and
included a handwritten provision that stated, "Don't want freezing at this
67
time."'" Despite the provision, the clinic froze the preembryos.' However,
Margaret testified that they had changed their minds to allow freezing a few
minutes after signing the agreement, though they did not alter the form.'6 In
the divorce proceedings, Margaret sought the use of the preembryos to implant
them in herself to attempt to become pregnant. 69 Cook County Circuit Court
Judge Gerald C. Bender issued an injunction preventing the clinic from
70
disposing of or implanting the preembryos until the dispute was resolved.'
If the judge were to find the preembryos were "persons," it would vest them
Todd.'7 '
with "legally cognizable interests" apart from those of Margaret and
Thus, the legal rights of Todd and Margaret could be superseded by those of
the preembryo 77 Their rights of procreation granted under constitutional law
could be challenged by a preembryo, the independent legal rights of which
have never been recognized.'" Creating such rights would either force the
genetic providers to become unwilling parents or grant to others the right to
"adopt" the preembryos 74 Given the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Roe, that the protection guaranteed to each "person" by the Fourteenth
Amendment is not provided to the "unborn," it is not likely that the view of
"preembryo as person" would be adopted. 7 The only court to hold that the
preembryos enjoyed such a status was the trial court in Davis, which was
subsequently rejected. 1 6 Even the Israeli Supreme Court, which is not

165. Elizabeth Neff, Behind Frozen-EmbryosCase Lies Consent Issue, Cm'. DAILY L.
BULL, Sept. 30, 1999, at 3.

166. There was a preprinted statement on the consent form: "[W]e hereby authorize and
consent to the cryopreservation of any surplus fertilized eggs for later transfer, donation, or
termination upon our mutual consent as required by law." Id.
167. Margaret O'Brien, Embryos Remain in Limbo as Hearing Takes a Break, CH.
TRIB., Sept. 16, 1999, § 2, at 3.

168. Id.

Neff, supra note 165, at 3.
170. Id. Though the case appears to have been settled, the facts still allow for analysis.
169.

David Pasulka, Embryo Dispute in Divorce Case Near Settlement, Attorney Says, Cm. TRIB.,

Oct. 26, 1999, § 2, at 3.
171. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992).
172. Luongo, supranote 128, at 1019-20.
173. Id. at 1020.

174. Id.
175. See id. at 1019; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
176. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594-97 (Tenn. 1992); Davis v. Davis, No. E14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *1 (Tenn. Cir.Ct. Sept. 21, 1989).

NORTHERN IINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 21

encumbered by the Roe decision, did not recognize the "personhood" of the
preembryo, but based its decision on the rights of the "mother" superseding
those of the "father."'"
The Illinois trial court could find the embryo was the "property" of
Ginestra and Hale. 78 This would afford the parties the right to make contracts
regarding the disposition, but would ignore the preembryos' "potential" for
human life and any state interest in such "potential."'7 The effect of this view
would really not be equal rights between the parties, as it would grant Ginestra
essentially the power to veto any transfer of the preembryos and ensure their
destruction."n Given this inequitable situation and loss of state interest, it is
also unlikely that the "preembryos as property" view would be adopted.
Therefore, the most likely selection would be the "special respect" view
adopted by the court in Davis.'' This view grants the preembryo greater
respect than other human tissue because it has potential to become a human
being. 2 However, it is not treated as a person because it has not developed
as an individual and indeed may never fully develop."n This interim status
between "person" and "property" recognizes that the genetic providers have
primary decision-making authority, but such authority may be superseded if
specific legislation to the contrary exists.'U This approach also allows the
balancing of each party's interests to determine an equitable outcome. 5
Should the status of the preembryos be determined under the widely held
"special respect" view, the Davis balancing test would be the best approach to
adopt in resolving conflicts over frozen preembryos between divorcing parties.
To resolve the dispute, the court would first consider the validity of the
consent form. ' If the written consent form between Todd Ginestra, Margaret
Hale and the IVF clinic was found valid, then Todd would prevail, as the
agreement would be considered controlling.'
If the court were to find an
ambiguity in the contract or that a modification to allow cryopreservation had
occurred, Margaret would still not necessarily prevail.' At that point, the
177. IsraeliCourtAsked to Stop Woman from Surrogacy Effort, supra note 105.
178. See supra Part IIJ.B.
179. See Siegel, supra note 27, at 51.
180. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598.
181. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.

182. Luongo, supra note 128, at 1022.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1023.

185. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603.
186. See id. at 597.
187. See id.
188. The Davis court determined that a prior agreement would be carried out, but if no
agreement existed then, the relative interests of the parties would have to be weighed. Finding
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court would balance the interests of each party to determine who had the
greater interest in obtaining the preembryos.' An excellent analysis based on
the Davis balancing test was performed by the dissent of the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in Kass.'" The first consideration would
be "whether the ex-wife possesses reasonable opportunities to achieve
motherhood by other alternatives."'' Other considerations include the exwife's age, her physical, emotional and financial condition and the impact of
those conditions on any future attempt at IVF." The Kass dissent would
consider whether the ex-wife has the financial resources to effectively relieve
the ex-husband of future child support obligations should she agree to attempt
to waive such obligations.' 3 Also, adoption would have to be examined to see
if it was a reasonable possibility." 4 Finally, the dissent would inquire into the
depth and sincerity of the ex-wife's "emotional investment in this reproductive
opportunity.","
Weighed against Margaret's interests are the burdens associated with
Todd's unwanted fatherhood. '" As the biological father, he would have a duty
to support the child to age of majority because there is no way to completely
relieve a father of this obligation even if the ex-wife was willing to bear it
alone." 7 There also may be moral and psychological conflicts for a man who
is compelled to procreate with an ex-wife against his will.'" All of these
considerations taken together would be balanced to determine who had the
that a contract was invalid would be the same as if no agreement existed. See id. at 604.
189.
190.

dissenting).

Id.
Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 599 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (Miller, J.P.,

191. One question raised by the dissent was whether there existed any additional, already
harvested, unfertilized eggs which could be fertilized by another man's sperm. This would not
appear to apply in this case. Id. at 600 (Miller, J.P., dissenting).
192. Id. (Miller, J.P., dissenting).
193. Parents are required to support their children according to their means and the needs

of the children. Id. This observation is based on New York law. Similar constraints on the
waiver of obligation appear in Illinois. See Blisset v. Blisset, 526 N.E.2d 125, 128 (111. 1988);
Johnston v. Johnston, 553 N.E.2d 93, 96 (Il. App. Ct. 1990).

194. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 600 (Miller, J.P., dissenting). The Davis court had pointed
out the fact that Mary Sue and Junior Davis pursued adoption, indicating that she may have
been "willing to forego genetic parenthood and would have been satisfied by the child-rearing
aspects of parenthood alone." Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
195. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 600 (Miller, J.P., dissenting).
196. See id. (Miller, J.P., dissenting).
197. However, issues of support may not be relevant where an ex-husband has no means
(Miller, J.P., dissenting).
of income due to disability or incarceration. Id.
198. An ex-husband with such legitimate conflicts could have "to deal with acrimonious
visitation and/or custody disputes." The ex-husband may be forced to accept that his "genetic
offspring walks the earth without his love and guidance." Id. at 601 (Miller, J.P., dissenting).
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greater interest in obtaining the preembryos.'" Such considerations, though,
are obviously highly factual and would have to be determined on a case-bycase analysis.' Though preliminary in nature, in this case it would appear
that Todd would prevail, as his interest not to be a father would outweigh
Margaret's interest in motherhood.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION

In December of 1999, the Committee on the Laws of Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Genetics of the American Bar Association issued a
discussion draft of its Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act."' Parts
of this act, if adopted, would help prevent disputes over frozen preembryos.
The act would require that parties participating in IVF programs complete
informed consent forms and written agreements regarding the disposition of
frozen preembryos.' Under the informed consent requirements of the act, the
parties are informed that "the couple, not the clinic, has the right to control the
fate of the preembryos and clarify the ownership over the [preembryos]. ' 2 3
Such a requirement would have avoided the problem in York.' The act also
requires that "written authorization" must include a preembryo disposition
agreement 2°5 and that the "authorization must be signed before any medical
Another interesting provision
treatment or drug regiments are initiated."'
requires the parties to enter into evaluation and counseling before a procedure
involving the transfer of preembryos to a gestational carrier.' This provision

199.

However, if the party seeking control of the preembryos intends merely to donate

them to another couple, then the objecting party has the greater interest and should prevail.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
200. See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 601 (Miller, J.P., dissenting).
201. MODEL ASSiSTED REPROD. TECHS. Acr (Discussion Draft 1999).
202.

MODELASSISTEDREPROD. TECHS. AcT § 1.02(1). As a note to the Committee, the

205.

MODELASSISTED REPROD. TEms. AcT § 1.02(3)(d).

term "embryo" should either be changed to "preembryo" or a definition of "embryo" should be
provided. See supra note 1.
203. MODEL ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS. AcT § 1.02(1)(h).
204. If such a law had existed in Virginia, the clinic would have known in advance it
could not refuse the transfer of the preembryo per the Yorks' desire. See York v. Jones, 717 F.
Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
206. MODEL ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS. AcT § 1.02(4).
207. MODELASSiSTEDREPROD. TECHS. Acr§1.03(2). A "gestational carrier" is defined
as "an adult woman, not an intended parent, who enters into an agreement to gestate and bear
a child whether or not she is genetically-related to the resulting child through the provision of
her gametes, conceived through assisted conception for an intended parent(s)." MODEL
ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS. ACT § 1.01(11).
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will deal with the concerns raised by the Kass dissent regarding the psychological impact on parties."8
In order to prevent any confusion that may occur about what may happen
to preembryos prior to their transfer to the uterus, the act requires that before
each retrieval of eggs or transfer of preembryos the IVF provider must disclose
the potential preembryo dispositions and indicate which are offered by the
provider.'
Perhaps the most important section which would help prevent future
divorce disputes is section 1.05 of the Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act, which provides for "Parental and Donor Rights and Obligations
Under Embryo Agreements."'2 Under the act, binding written agreements
would be required to be entered into prior to the creation of the preembryo and
would include: "(1) their intended use and disposition of the [preembryos]; (2)
the use and disposition of the [preembryos] in the event of divorce, illness,
death or other change of circumstances; and (3) the time at which, and
conditions under which, [preembryos] will be deemed abandoned and
disposition thereof." '' This agreement must incorporate when "an intended
parent may use the preembryos in the event of a divorce, illness, or death of
the other intended parent." ' It must "[c]larify which intended parent may

208. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
209. The potential offered embryo dispositions include:
(a) storage, including length of time, costs and location;
(b) use by the patient(s) with the intent to transfer embryos to the
patient;
(c) donation
(1) to a known individual or couple with the intent to transfer,
(2) to an anonymous individual or couple with the intent to
transfer,
(3) for research, and
(d) to advance infertility options, or
(e) other research, which must be detailed;

(0 destruction.

MODEL ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS. Acr § 1.04(1).

210. MODELASStSTEDREPROD. TECHs. Acr§ 1.05(1).
211. MODEL ASSISTED REPROD. TEtcs. Acr § 1.05(l)(a). The act provides that "in the
absence of any written agreement to the contrary, embryos may be considered only after a
minimum period of time, not less than five years following creation" and after "a diligent search
to locate and notify the participants that their preembryos are considered abandoned." MODEL
ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS. ACT § 1.05(4)(a). Abandoned preembryos, however, cannot be
"donated to another couple or individual without the original intended parents and participants'
contemporaneous re-consent, unless the donors have previously consented to such donation in
accordance with the participants' prior executed written agreement." MODEL ASSISTED
REPROD. TEcMS. Acr § 1.05(4)(c).
212. MODELASSiSTED REPROD. TECHS. Acr § 1.05(1)(c)(1).
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control the preembryos in the event of divorce, illness or death."'213 It must
incorporate whether
in the event of a subsequent disagreement between intended
parents, wherein one intended parent no longer wishes to
use stored preembryos to create a child as previously agreed,
following a divorce, that intended parent may use the
preembryos to create a child as previously agreed; however,
the non-consentingintendedparentwould not be considered
a legal parent of any resulting child and will have no
parentalrights or obligationsto any resulting child t 4
While this provision would address the economic concerns of the nonconsenting parent (i.e., as to child support) it may not help address the
emotional impact of knowing one's genetic child exists without any rights to
visitation or care."' However, since all decisions must be made in advance,
the non-consenting parent will have had to address the issue of such a situation
arising prior to creating the preembryo.21 The act would make it illegal "for
any provider to create embryos unless such written consents are obtained and
placed in a permanent file."2 "'
Given the increase in people turning to artificial reproductive technologies,"' the need for legislative action is becoming more imperative. The
Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act will "provide a flexible
framework that will serve as a mechanism to both resolve contemporary
controversies," such as disputes over frozen embryos in divorce situations, and
"incorporate future evolvement in family creation."2 9 It is urged that states
adopt the act and take the uncertainty out of the legal considerations of assisted
reproductive technologies.
CONCLUSION

Determining which party should control preembryos in a divorce situation
is an unpleasant task within an already potentially acrimonious atmosphere.
The best solution is for parties to decide in advance what the disposition of the
preembryos should be prior to beginning the IVF program. Absent such
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agreement, the balancing test provided in Davis is by far the most equitable
solution in dealing with this unpleasant situation.' This test, though, requires
the court to recognize the "special respect" which the preembryo deserves."'
The concepts of preembryos as "persons" or "property" are too broad and
inflexible. The concept of "person" allows preembryos to supersede their
progenitors' rights of procreation."m The concept of "property" allows equal
"ownership" of the preembryo, but allows a party objecting to their implantation to essentially veto such action by not allowing the use of the
preembryos. m Only the "special respect" view allows for the balancing of
interests between the parties and produces the most equitable outcome.
The best proactive solution would be for legislatures of the states to adopt
the Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act created by the Committee
on the Laws of Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Genetics of the
American Bar Association. Such legislation would require parties to reach
agreements as to the disposition of preembryos in specific situations, such as
divorce, prior to the IVF treatment. The act puts the onus on the lYF provider
to inform the participants of their legal rights and obligations and obtain
written consents and agreements from the participants prior to creating a
preembryo.' It is urged that legislatures consider this act to prevent future
25
disputes such as Davis v. Davis."'
THOMAS
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